









In this study, we investigate how country-level myopia affects managers’ willingness to engage in earnings 
management and choice of earnings management strategy. Using a comprehensive dataset of 47 countries 
for the time period from 2003 to 2015, we find that firms in short-term oriented cultures engage in more 
real earnings management, while firms in long-term oriented cultures rely on earnings management through 
accruals manipulation. Furthermore, we find a larger discontinuity around earnings benchmarks in long-
term oriented cultures suggesting that utilization of AM enables benchmark beating with high precision.  
 
 











In this study, we investigate the relationship between myopia and earnings management (EM) in a cross-
country setting. EM is commonly defined as managerial actions to alter accounting earnings towards a 
predetermined benchmark, and can further be divided into two categories: accrual manipulation (AM) and 
real earnings management (RM). The former is associated with discretion over the accrual component of 
earnings, while the latter involves opportunistic real business decisions. Both methods are connected to 
potential costs. For example, firms engaging in AM are subject to higher auditor and regulatory scrutiny if 
they make aggressive accrual choices, while RM can be detrimental to firm value since it increases current 
cash flows at the expense of future cash flows (Graham et al., 2005; Bhojraj et al., 2009; Vorst, 2016). 
Based on the costs associated with the respective manipulation method, Zang (2012) shows that there exists 
a tradeoff between AM and RM and that managers use them as substitutes.  
While Zang (2012) focuses on the firm-level costs affecting the choice of EM method, such as auditor size, 
distress risk and market share, we highlight a broader picture of perceived costs arising from national 
culture. Earlier studies (e.g., Nabar et al., 2007; Han et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2013) show that national 
culture has an effect on the propensity to engage in EM. Our study expands on this literature and focuses 
on cultural perceptions of how short- versus long-term gains are valued. We hypothesize that differences 
in cultural myopia will affect the engagement in AM and RM. Specifically, we expect that firms in 
environments characterized by a low level of myopia (i.e., long-term oriented) are more likely to engage in 
AM than firms in myopic environments (i.e., short-term oriented) which are more likely to engage in RM. 
We base our expectation on the inherent characteristics of the EM methods and the notion that firms in 
myopic countries emphasize current cash flows to a larger extent than firms in long-term oriented countries. 
In a related study, Kim et al. (2017) investigate languages and EM. They find that RM is less prevalent 
where the language has a weaker future time reference and argue that such languages are associated with 
more future oriented behavior, and are thus less likely to engage in RM. Furthermore, Ernstberger et al. 
(2017) find an increase in RM for firms switching towards a more frequent reporting regime. They argue 
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that more frequent financial reporting leads to higher managerial myopia, and consequently more RM. 
However, prior studies have not investigated whether a myopic culture influences the propensity of EM 
and the tradeoff between RM versus AM at a country-level. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap in 
the literature.  
The majority of the EM research have been conducted on data from the United States (U.S). An example 
of U.S. specific evidence is the highly cited survey finding by Graham et al. (2005), that 80 percent of 
executives are prepared to cut research and development (R&D), advertising, and maintenance costs in 
order to meet earnings benchmarks. Roychowdhury (2006) supports the survey evidence with archival U.S. 
data. In the context of our study, it is important to note that the U.S. culture is characterized by a higher 
than average emphasis on achieving quick results. Hofstede et al. (2010) characterize this behavior as short-
term oriented. Naturally, heterogeneity exists in terms of the long-term orientation of individuals, firms and 
cultures. For example, in contrast to the U.S., countries such as South Korea and Japan are long-term 
oriented. Hofstede et al. (2010) characterize people in long-term oriented societies as individuals valuing 
thriftiness and perseverance. Based on these cross-country differences in culture, it is questionable whether 
findings such as Graham et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006) can be generalized to the international 
arena.  
Cross-country studies provide evidence that EM varies between countries and is influenced by national 
characteristics. Leuz et al. (2003) find that countries with stronger legal systems are associated with less 
aggregate EM. Burgstahler et al. (2006) show how private and public firms manage earnings differently. In 
addition, culture as a national characteristic has been shown to significantly influence EM. Nabar and 
Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) argue that AM is negatively related to Hofstede’s (1980) culture measures of 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Han et al. (2010) suggest that cultural values as well as institutional 
characteristics explain AM around the world. Callen et al. (2011) find a negative relation between aggregate 
EM and individualism but a positive relation with uncertainty avoidance based on the updated culture 
measures of Tang and Koveos (2008). Less attention has been directed towards RM and international 
4 
 
differences. However, Francis et al. (2016) reveal that RM increases with stronger legal systems, which 
contrasts Leuz et al. (2003). The fact that AM is more costly than RM in stronger legal systems is provided 
as a reasonable explanation to this finding. Furthermore, Paredes and Wheatley (2017) focus on RM in 
emerging markets and Hofstede’s (1980) measures of national culture. They find a negative association 
between RM and individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance, but a positive association with 
power distance. While these studies investigate EM and country characteristics, they overlook the impact 
of myopic culture.  
Using the Hofstede et al. (2010) long-term orientation score, we examine the association between country-
level myopia and the two forms of EM. We use a large sample comprising 47 countries for the time period 
2003 to 2015. We measure AM following the frequently utilized procedure in Dechow et al. (1995) and 
Kothari et al. (2005). We measure RM following Roychowdhury (2006) in the form of sales manipulation, 
overproduction, and abnormal discretionary expenditures and correct for firm-level characteristics. In 
contrast to prior cross-country studies on EM (e.g., Han et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2016; Paredes and 
Wheatley, 2017), we focus on a strong incentive for EM in all of our tests. Namely, we interact our measure 
of myopic culture with firm-years just meeting or beating key earnings benchmarks. According to 
Roychowdhury (2006), this method is crucial when capturing the actual effect of EM. Analyzing EM in the 
absence of a clear incentive setting may cause spurious results because the AM measures are noisy by 
construction and the RM measures capture both opportunistic and prudent business decisions if modeled 
without underlying incentives (Vorst, 2016; Siriviriyakul, 2015).  
We first examine the association between RM and myopia around the world. We find that firms in myopic 
cultures are more prone to engage in RM to meet or beat the benchmark of zero earnings and prior year’s 
earnings. Second, we find that firms in long-term oriented cultures engage in more AM to beat earnings 
benchmarks than firms in myopic cultures. These findings are consistent with the view that firms in long-
term oriented cultures avoid EM methods that are detrimental to firm value. Based on the inherent 
characteristics of the respective EM strategy, in terms of how and when the different strategies are used, 
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we hypothesize that a consequence of AM is more accurate benchmark beating. Considering the sample as 
a whole, we observe that firms around the globe manage earnings to avoid losses and earnings decreases. 
However, we find that this discontinuity in the earnings distribution around benchmarks is driven by firms 
in long-term oriented countries and consequently that a greater reliance on AM is associated with a larger 
discontinuity. For robustness purposes, we consider an alternative sample and alternative measures of 
myopia.  
In summary, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence showing that cross-country differences 
in myopia is associated with the choice of EM strategies in settings where there is a clear incentive to 
manage earnings. While prior studies have focused on a U.S. setting, where myopia is prevalent, we focus 
on an international setting which gives us the possibility to disentangle the effect of myopia on a country-
level. Our results indicate that the Graham et al. (2005) and the Roychowdhury (2006) findings are not 
necessarily applicable in the international context. Furthermore, depending on the country of analysis, our 
results suggest that researchers should account for the various costs and benefits of different EM strategies.  
In undertaking our analysis, we employ a fixed-effects model to estimate RM. According to Siriviriyakul 
et al. (2015) this method mitigates the omitted variable problem of previous studies.  We also avoid sample 
attrition with this technique. Finally, our findings add to the Zang (2012) evidence in support of the tradeoff 
between AM and RM, relating to the costs of different EM methods.  
This paper continues as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops our hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes our data, research method, and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results of 
our analyses. Section 5 describe our robustness tests while the last section concludes.  
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Earnings management 
Accounting earnings, defined as the sum of cash flows and accruals, are commonly known to be an 
important component in the pricing of debt and equity.  Beginning with the seminal work of Ball and Brown 
(1968), it is known that the financial markets react to accounting earnings or earnings announcements based 
on the information content of financial statements. The accounting and finance literature has also 
recognized the managerial incentive to influence accounting earnings in order to ensure that earnings arrive 
at or above their preferred benchmarks. The most natural benchmarks are to meet or beat zero earnings and 
prior year’s earnings. The term EM is frequently used to describe actions where managers influence 
accounting earnings to meet or beat benchmarks (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). A number of U.S. studies also 
find EM based on the underlying incentive to arrive at higher levels of earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Brown and Caylor, 2005). Meanwhile, Shipper (1989) recognizes that EM 
often incorporates both opportunistic as well as information signaling actions.  
Previous accounting and finance literature has largely been interested in managerial discretion of the accrual 
component of earnings (AM). Namely, managers are granted a large portion of discretion in the financial 
reporting process by the subjectivity of the accounting rules and regulations. For example, managers have 
a given degree of discretion in determining various accruals, such as depreciation rates, amounts of bad 
debt, and asset write-offs. Evidence of AM has been documented in contexts of debt covenants (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994), managerial compensation (Healy, 1985), and political costs (Jones, 1991). These 
studies detect and use abnormal accruals as a proxy for AM. By definition, AM does not have a direct effect 
on future cash flow.  
To influence the cash flow component of earnings, managers need to alter operational activities. 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines RM as managerial actions that deviate from normal business practices, 
which are undertaken with the ultimate goal of meeting certain earnings benchmarks. Examples of RM 
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include, but are not limited to, managers departing from normal operational activities in the form of granting 
price discounts, or reducing discretionary expenditures such as R&D and advertising costs. Another 
example is overproduction to decrease cost of goods sold or underinvestment in long-term projects (i.e., 
myopic investment). Several researchers have examined the U.S. setting in the context of RM. For example, 
researchers find that managers engage in RM in order to meet financial reporting benchmarks to avoid 
reporting annual losses (Roychowhury, 2006), before issuing seasoned equity offerings (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010), and in order to avoid poor credit ratings (Brown et al., 2015). RM has a direct cash flow 
effect because it is associated with real business decisions. Similar actions might decrease firm value in the 
long-run. For instance, managers deciding to decrease R&D expenditures in order to increase current period 
earnings, might affect sales in the future due to lack of innovative products.  
Vorst (2016) also provide specific evidence of the value-destroying nature of RM. The study shows that 
RM is associated with lower future operating performance. The findings in Ernstberger et al. (2017) are 
consistent with this view. Similarly, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) suggest that the costs of RM outweigh its 
potential benefits in a seasoned equity offering setting. Bushee (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) both find 
a negative association between institutional ownership and RM, which can be explained by sophisticated 
institutional investors being more focused on firms’ long-term interests and less on short-term actions that 
increase current period earnings.  
While RM is found to be value-destroying, survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) shows that 80 percent 
of U.S. executives are willing to cut R&D, advertising, and maintenance expenditures with the aim of 
meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, while accrual maneuvers to manage earnings are less preferred 
by the surveyed executives. There are several reasons to why managers might prefer RM actions to AM. 
First, aggressive accrual choices are subject to higher auditor and regulatory scrutiny. For example, auditors 
are more likely to challenge a firm’s accounting choices than real economic actions. Second, AM is 
constrained by the underlying transactions in the current year and AM of previous years (Barton and Simko, 
2002). Moreover, AM occurs at the end of the fiscal period while RM may be applied continuously during 
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the period. Therefore, Roychowdhury (2006) argues that U.S. managers use RM throughout the reporting 
period to beat earnings benchmarks. 
Publicly listed firms are inherently motivated to meet earnings benchmarks because stakeholders often 
implement heuristic cut-offs to determine the performance of a firm (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). For 
example, managers can avoid a reputational loss by making sure to report an accounting profit. 
Furthermore, managers consider meeting earnings benchmarks important because it helps to build 
credibility on the capital markets and maintain or increase the stock price (Graham et al. 2005). As a result, 
prior literature documents that the capital markets push public firms to meet earnings benchmarks such as 
avoiding losses and decreases in earnings (Conrad et al., 2002). Moreover, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
provide evidence that U.S. firms have unusually high frequencies of small positive earnings in relation to 
small losses. Meanwhile, Gore et al. (2007) focus on U.K. firms and investigate the distribution of earnings 
relative to earnings benchmarks. Here, discontinuities in the earnings distribution around earnings 
benchmarks are interpreted as evidence of EM. They find an explicit link between AM and the discontinuity 
around zero and prior year’s earnings. The results of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Gore et al. (2007) 
stand in contrast to the U.S. evidence presented in Dechow et al. (2003), that the difference between average 
AM for small profit versus small loss firms is statistically insignificant. Dechow et al. (2003) suggest that 
managers achieve benchmarks via RM, without investigating this matter any further. This alternative 
explanation is empirically supported by Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010), who show that public 
firms in the U.S. avoid reporting annual losses with the help of RM. Based on these studies, we expect RM 
to be associated with the small profits and small profit increases reported by the firms in our international 
sample. 
2.2 Myopia and earnings management 
The majority of EM studies are limited to the U.S. market. However, based on international data, Leuz et 
al. (2003) find that countries with stronger legal systems are associated with less AM. Burgstahler et al. 
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(2006) report on international differences between public and private firms, and find more AM in private 
firms. Francis et al. (2008) find that stronger investor protection is negatively related to AM, but only for 
firms with large auditors. With respect to RM, Francis et al. (2016) conversely reveal that it increases with 
stronger legal systems. Meanwhile, recent studies by Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007), Han et al. (2010), 
and Paredes and Wheatley (2017) show that culture has an effect on managers’ engagement in EM. For 
example, Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) and Han et al. (2010) find that firms in countries scoring low 
on Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance measure engage in more AM. Based on time-adjusted cultural 
variables, Callen et al. (2011) find a negative relation between aggregate EM and individualism but a 
positive relation with uncertainty avoidance. 
While the impact of cultural aspects on EM has been investigated by prior studies, the relationship between 
cross-country differences in cultural myopia and EM remains largely unexplored. Meanwhile, studies show 
that a low level of myopia or long-term orientation affects managerial decisions. Kitching et al. (2016) 
report that cost stickiness is less pronounced in long-term oriented countries. Furthermore, Orlova et al. 
(2017) show that long-term orientation is negatively related to cash holdings. Generally, management in 
future oriented countries provide long-term employment, honesty, and thriftiness (Newman and Nollen, 
1996). Managerial long-term orientation is also affected by other factors than culture. In a theoretical model, 
Gigler et al. (2014) propose that a higher reporting frequency might create pressure for managerial myopia. 
Ernstberger et al. (2017) support this proposal with empirical evidence, by showing that firms required to 
increase the reporting frequency engage in more value-destroying RM.  
In our study, we use the Hofstede et al. (2010) long- versus short-term orientation score as a proxy for 
myopia. Hofstede et al. (2010) describes the long-term orientation score as a measure of how countries and 
societies have to maintain some links with their past while dealing with the challenges of the present and 
future. More concrete, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) argue that long-term oriented cultures value learning, 
honesty, accountability, and self-discipline. Another aspect is that firms from short-term oriented countries 
put more focus on current profits and other short-term measures. There is also a more distinct view of good 
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and evil, right and wrong, in short-term oriented cultures. Meanwhile, long-term oriented cultures evaluate 
good and evil depending upon the circumstances.  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
Based on the cross-country differences in myopic culture and the inherent differences between the EM 
strategies, we formulate our hypotheses. Regardless of whether the management of a firm is influenced by 
a short- or long-term oriented culture, the same incentives to conduct EM to beat benchmarks apply. 
However, we hypothesize that culture affects the choice of ultimate EM strategy. For example, long-term 
oriented management is characterized by an unwillingness to jeopardize future cash flows for the benefit 
of current performance. In contrast, management influenced by myopia overemphasizes the impact of 
current earnings and underemphasizes the negative future consequences of engaging in RM. Therefore, RM 
remains a valid option in myopic cultures. Graham et al. (2005) correspondingly provides evidence that 
management in the short-term oriented U.S. prefer the RM strategy. Graham et al. (2005) and McGuire et 
al. (2012) also propose that managers view RM as an ethically preferable alternative to AM. Since myopic 
cultures are more associated with a distinction between right and wrong, we believe that myopic cultures 
are more prone to choose RM before AM. Based on the above arguments, we develop our first hypothesis: 
H1: Long-term orientation is negatively associated with RM. 
Zang (2012) argues that management considers the costs associated with the different EM strategies and 
correspondingly engages in the less costly alternative. Management in a long-term oriented culture will 
recognize that utilizing RM as their primary EM strategy will hurt future cash flows (Vorst, 2016; 
Ernstberger et al., 2017). Therefore, they will avoid utilizing such value-destroying methods extensively. 
However, since long-term orientation does not affect the underlying incentives to engage in EM, this results 
in an increase in the relative importance of AM. Consistent with the tradeoff argument in Zang (2012), we 
develop our second hypothesis: 
H2: Long-term orientation is positively associated with AM. 
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The RM strategy includes manipulation of operating activities throughout the year (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
In contrast, AM is associated with accrual decisions that occur at the end of the fiscal period. Consequently, 
management that relies on the AM strategy is able to manage earnings at a higher level of precision. For 
example, it is possible to precisely calculate the effects on year-end earnings, when changing the 
depreciation method for fixed assets in the end of the fiscal period. It is however harder to estimate the 
ultimate effects on earnings, when management engages in RM during the year. For example, firms 
decreasing R&D, advertising, or maintenance expenditures in the middle of the fiscal period are not as 
likely to estimate the year-end earnings with precision since a substantial part of the transactions are not 
yet accounted for. Based on the characteristics of the respective EM strategy, a consequence of AM is 
accurate benchmark beating which will result in a discontinuity in the earnings distribution around the 
benchmarks. Correspondingly, RM is more likely to result in firms largely beating the benchmark, which 
leads to a less pronounced discontinuity around the benchmarks. Considering our expectation that RM is 
positively associated with myopic cultures and that AM is more pronounced in long-term oriented cultures, 
we formulate the third hypothesis: 
H3: The discontinuity around earnings benchmarks is larger in long-term oriented countries. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
We build our sample of firms based on the countries covered by Hofstede et al. (2010). For these firms, we 
extract annual accounting data in U.S. dollars from the Worldscope database covering the time period 2003 
through 2015. We remove all observations that have missing data for any of our key variables: total assets, 
cost of goods sold, sales, cash flows from operations, inventory, property, plant and equipment, and 
earnings before interest and taxes. We also exclude all regulated and financial firms (SIC codes 4400-4899 
and 6000-6399). Further, we exclude all secondary listings. Firms with negative market-to-book values and 
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with extreme ROA values are also excluded. To further ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, 
we winsorize the top and bottom at the 1 percent level for all firm-level variables in our sample. Moreover, 
we remove all firms in countries with less than 100 firm-year observations. After implementing these 
cleaning methods, we have a data set that contains 237,525 firm-year observations representing 47 
countries. As expected, most of our firm-year observations originates from the U.S (36,278 firm-year 
observations). 
3.2 Measures of earnings management 
In our analyses, we utilize two measures of EM. We follow Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) 
in our calculations of AM. By doing so, we regress total accruals (TACC) calculated with the cash flow 
approach on the reciprocal of lagged total assets (A), change in sales less change in receivables (ΔS−ΔAR), 
gross property, plant, and equipment (GPPE), and return on assets (ROA). These variables are expected to 
explain the normal level of accruals. For example, the level of fixed assets is expected to explain the amount 
of depreciation. By subtracting the normal accruals from TACC, we obtain the abnormal accruals which 
are interpreted as AM. We formulate Equation (1) as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets. We use the residuals (ε) from the industry-year regressions 
of Equation (1) as our proxy for AM.  
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we investigate three RM activities: sales manipulation, overproduction, 
and decreasing discretionary expenditures. However, we implement one change to the estimation technique. 
Instead of estimating RM separately for each year and industry (2-digit SIC level), we use panel regressions 
with year and firm fixed-effects. The reason for this approach is the recent criticism of the original RM 
measures. Siriviriyakul (2015) shows that the original RM measures are highly persistent over time. For 
example, firms with observed high abnormal cash flow from operations at time t-1 are likely to have high 
13 
 
abnormal cash flow from operations also at time t. The persistence of the Roychowdhury (2006) measures 
suggests an omitted variable problem (Gunny 2010, Siriviriyakul 2015). As a result, recent studies present 
three approaches to mitigate the problem. First, Cohen et al. (2016) suggest an alternative RM measure 
based on performance matching. The authors argue that managers’ choices regarding discounts, production 
and discretionary expenses are likely not only a function of their need to manage earnings, but also of the 
firms’ underlying economic performance. A consequence will be severely miss-specified RM measures and 
their suggestion is an estimation approach based on performance matching to mitigate the misspecification. 
Second, Vorst (2016) presents a REM measure for investments that incorporates reversals. Logically, 
abnormal investment levels can be caused by either EM or changes in business dynamics. If EM is the 
cause of the abnormal investment levels, there should be a reversal effect. Therefore, adjusting the RM 
measures for reversals should improve the measures by mitigating the omitted variable problem. Third, 
Kothari et al. (2016) use a fixed-effects first-order autoregressive model to mitigate the issue that certain 
firms are constantly misclassified as exhibiting RM because of fundamental differences in operating and 
business activities. Siriviriyakul (2015) compares these three approaches. According to the results, 
measures of RM estimated with year and firm fixed-effects show the most desirable features. 
Following the discussion on the measurement of RM, we estimate the RM measures developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006) with fixed year and firm effects. To generate the first measure, we express normal 
cash flow from operations (CFO) as a linear function of sales and change in sales in the current period: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
For the first RM measure, the abnormal level (ACFO) is calculated by subtracting the normal CFO, 
calculated using estimated coefficients from the corresponding model, from the actual CFO. Thus, the error 
term represents the abnormal level of CFO. ACFO is multiplied by negative one so that a positive number 
is associated with income-increasing RM. 
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The second RM measure, abnormal production costs, consists of two separate estimates including cost of 
goods sold (COGS) and change in inventory (ΔINV). Normal production costs (PROD = COGS + ΔINV) 
are expressed as a linear function of sales, change in sales, and the one-year lagged change in sales: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (3) 
In the third RM measure, DISEXP is defined as the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses, and 
SG&A expenses. The following regression estimates the normal level of DISEXP: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (4) 
Again, the error term represents the abnormal level of DISEXP (ADISEXP). This measure is multiplied by 
negative one so that a positive number is associated with income-increasing RM. 
In accordance with Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we construct a composite measure 
by standardizing and aggregating the three measures into one metric (RM) which captures the total effect 
of RM.  
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides country-level descriptive statistics for our sample, including firm-level variables and the 
long-term orientation score (LTO) from Hofstede et al. (2010), which is our measure of country-level 
myopia. The short-term oriented U.S. (LTO: 26) dominates the sample structure with regards to firm-years, 
followed closely by the long-term oriented country Japan (LTO: 88). Column (4) and (5) report the median 
of signed and absolute RM measures. Here, the signed values are close to zero and the absolute values 
indicate abnormal operating activities that include both opportunistic and prudent business decisions. 
Correspondingly, Column (6) and (7) report the AM measures in signed and absolute forms. Positive signed 
values indicate income-increasing behavior and Portuguese firms have most upward AM (0.023). Absolute 
values indicate financial reporting quality and Venezuelan firms have the poorest quality (0.061). Column 
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(8), (9), and (10) report median firm size, profitability, and leverage. Here we find that countries such as 
Mexico and Brazil have a substantial proportion of large firms. One partial explanation is that Worldscope 
has only coverage of large firms in some emerging markets. In terms of leverage, the Mediterranean 
countries share the highest ratios.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
In addition to the EM and LTO variable, we include a number of control variables following the established 
literature on country factors and EM (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2016; Kitching et al., 2016; 
Paredes and Wheatley, 2017). First, we include three firm-level variables to control for firm size, 
profitability and leverage (SIZE, ROA, and LEV). Second, we include the following culture variables of 
Hofstede (1980): power distance (PDI) and masculinity (MAS). The remaining Hofstede measures, 
uncertainty avoidance, individuality and indulgence are not included in the main results due to high 
correlations with LTO (0.56, −0.64, −0.61). Third, we include other country-level controls such as the 
Transparency International corruption index (CORR), the Human Development Index (HDI), judicial 
efficiency (JUD), shareholder rights (RIGHTS_SH), creditor rights (RIGHTS_CR), ownership 
concentration (OWN), and the change in gross domestic product (GPD). Appendix A reports the variable 
definitions. 
Table 2 reports a Pearson correlation matrix for all variables included in our full model (Equation 5). There 
is a positive relation between the two EM measures. We also observe LTO to be more positively related to 
AM, which lends preliminary support to the reasoning that high LTO countries rely more on AM. The 
correlations, although significant, are not high enough to raise concerns about correlation bias and issues 
of multicollinearity. Due to high correlations with LTO, we exclude several control variables used in prior 
literature (Leuz et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2016; Kitching et al., 2016; Paredes and Wheatley, 2017) such 
as the Hofstede (1980) scores for individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and indulgence, a common law 
dummy and the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008). However, the omission of these control 
variables do not change our results (untabulated). 
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[TABLE 2 HERE] 
3.4 Empirical model 
To investigate the relationship between EM and long-term orientation (H1 and H2) we employ the 
following regression model: 
EM𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 =  α0 +  β1(LTO𝑐) × (BENCH𝑐,𝑖,𝑡) + β2(BENCH𝑐,𝑖,𝑡) + β3(LTO𝑐) + β4(SIZE𝑐,𝑖.𝑡) +
β5(ROA𝑐,𝑖,𝑡) +  β6(LEV𝑐,𝑖,𝑡) + β7(PDI𝑐) + β8(MAS𝑐) +  β9 (CORR𝑐,𝑡) +  β10(HDI𝑐) +
 β11(JUD𝑐) + β12(RIGHTS_SH𝑐) +  β13(RIGHTS_CR𝑐) +  β14(OWN𝑐) +  β15(GDP𝑐,𝑡) + ε𝑐,𝑖,𝑡
           (5) 
We test the relationship between the EM strategies (AM and RM) and the Hofstede et al. (2010) measure 
for cultural long-term orientation (LTO) in separate regressions. According to Siriviriyakul (2015), the EM 
measures are suffering from noise and omitted variable problems. Therefore, testing signed EM measures 
in an incentive setting is key for achieving reliable results. Furthermore, the Roychowdhury (2006) 
measures may detect other than opportunistic behavior if they are used outside a specific incentive setting. 
Thus, we incorporate the incentive setting by using two variations of the BENCH dummy variable. In one 
specification we test for loss avoidance, where BENCH_A takes the value one if the ROA (net income 
scaled by total assets) is in the closed interval 0 to 0.01, while otherwise being zero. In another specification 
we test the benchmark of prior year’s earnings, where BENCH_B equals one if the net income in relation 
to prior year’s net income scaled by total assets is in the closed interval 0 to 0.01. We follow Gunny (2010) 
in our choice of interval widths. Our variable of interest in Equation (5) is the interaction of BENCH and 
LTO. The coefficient (β1) on this variable measures the incremental difference in EM between levels of 
LTO among firms suspect of having engaged in EM. A positive sign on this coefficient indicates that more 
income-increasing EM is associated with a higher level of LTO.  
To provide justification for our choice of incentive settings described above, we illustrate that the sample 
firms show a discontinuity around the zero earnings benchmark as well as around prior year’s earnings. 
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Figure 1 shows the discontinuity in the distribution both around zero (Panel A) and around prior year’s 
earnings (Panel B) for the sample as a whole. The discontinuity is most pronounced in Panel A, where the 
interval to the immediate left of zero has an unusually low frequency, while the interval to the immediate 
right of zero has an unusually high frequency. In Panel B, there is a distinct peak in the distribution in the 
interval from 0 to 0.01. Consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we interpret this as evidence of 
EM. As such, we find support for the use of the BENCH_A and BENCH_B dummy variables in our tests. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
We assess the statistical significance of the discontinuities around the benchmarks based on the asymmetry 




           (6) 
where nr is the number of observations in the interval directly to the right of the benchmark (BENCH firms); 
nl is the number of observations in the interval directly to the left of the benchmark; and nrl is the number 
of observations in both intervals. ASM can take values between −1 and 1 where a higher absolute value 
indicates a higher level of discontinuity. Following Gunny (2010), the distributions’ interval widths are 
0.01. We calculate two ASM measures, one for the zero earnings benchmark (ASM_A) and one for the 
prior year’s earnings benchmark (ASM_B). Further, we regress the country-level ASM on LTO to test H3. 




4.1 Long-termism and earnings management 
To test the first hypothesis (H1) whether RM is negatively related to long-termism, we utilize the incentive 
setting and regress RM on LTO, LTO×BENCH, and controls (Equation 5). Table 3 presents the results 
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from the main regression, in the context of beating zero earnings in Panel A and beating prior year’s 
earnings in Panel B. The first regression in Panel A is a baseline specification, which only includes the 
variable of interest (LTO×BENCH) with main effects and the firm-level controls. The second regression in 
Panel A corresponds with Equation (5), which includes industry and year fixed-effects, to control for 
variation in EM driven by a given industry or a given year. Due to missing country-level control variables, 
the number of observations decreases from 237,525 to 186,617 in the second regression. The coefficient on 
the interaction between LTO and the BENCH_A dummy is negative (−0.0003) and significant at the one 
percent level (t-stat: −3.04) in the first regression and also negative (−0.0001) and significant at the five 
percent level (t-stat: −2.00) in the full regression. A negative and significant coefficient on the interaction 
variable indicates that managers in long-term oriented countries engage in less RM to avoid losses, which 
is consistent with H1. Panel B of Table 3 follows the same structure as Panel A. The coefficient of the 
variable of interest is negative and statistically significant in both regressions, which is in line with the 
result in Panel A in the context of beating prior year’s earnings. The R-squared in the full regression is 
0.057, which is similar to that in Panel A. This explanatory power is acceptable when signed RM measures 
are used. In unreported results, we apply absolute measures and achieve a higher explanatory power, 
consistent with Francis et al. (2016) and Kim et al. (2017). In summary, the results in Table 3 indicate that 
firms in cultures that emphasize future rewards and long-term thinking engage in significantly less RM than 
firms existing in myopic cultures that are oriented towards current gains. Thus, we find evidence consistent 
with H1.   
In order to get a better understanding of the economic significance, we observe the three separate measures 
that underlie our total RM measure. Appendix B reports the regression results with the individual 
components as dependent variables. These results are driven by ACFO (coef: −0.0008, t-stat: −3.28) and 
APROD (coef: −0.0008, t-stat: −2.02). This suggests that for each ten point decrease in LTO, the average 
firm manages their earnings through sales manipulation by 0.08 percent of total assets and by 
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overproduction by 0.08 percent of total assets, in order to beat the zero earnings benchmark. We find similar 
results with prior year’s earnings. 
     [TABLE 3 HERE] 
We test the second hypothesis (H2) by utilizing AM as the dependent variable. The results are shown in 
Table 4, with the same structure as in Table 3. In Panel A of Table 4, the coefficient of the interaction term 
is 0.0001 (t-stat: 3.87) in the full regression. This suggests that for each ten score increase in LTO, the 
average firm manages their earnings through accruals by 0.1 percent of total assets, in order to beat the zero 
earnings benchmark. In Panel B of Table 4, the coefficient of the interaction term is also positive and 
statistically significant. These results are consistent with H2, i.e. long-term orientation is positively 
associated with the propensity to use AM to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
Our findings in Table 3 and Table 4 are consistent with the tradeoff argument in Zang (2012). Management 
in cultures characterized by long-termism are hesitant to rely on RM based on the perceived long-run costs 
associated with this EM strategy. Consequently, and in line with Zang (2012), firms in these countries show 
a larger reliance on AM, which is an EM strategy that doesn’t produce such costs. Our findings are also 
consistent with the view in Hofstede et al. (2010) that myopic cultures are more associated with absolute 
right and wrong which results in utilization of the more ethically perceived EM strategy, which according 
to Graham et al. (2005) and McGuire et al. (2012) is RM.  
4.2 Long-termism and earnings discontinuities 
We begin our test of H3 by replicating Figure 1 for the top and bottom tertile of countries with respect to 
the level of LTO. Figure 2 shows the discontinuity around zero earnings for the bottom LTO countries 
(Panel A) and the top LTO countries (Panel B). The discontinuity is clearly larger for the top LTO countries. 
The less pronounced discontinuity in the bottom LTO countries is consistent with Gilliam et al. (2015) who 
argue that the zero earnings discontinuity in the short-term oriented U.S. have disappeared after the passage 
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of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Furthermore, the pronounced discontinuity in the top LTO 
countries is in line with Enomoto and Yamaguchi (2017), who show that the discontinuity around the zero 
earnings benchmark did not disappear after the implementation of the Japanese version of SOX. Our finding 
is also in agreement with Cohen et al. (2008) who document a switch from a reliance on AM to costly RM 
among U.S. firms post SOX, which should lead to more inaccurate benchmark beating. With regards to the 
discontinuity around prior year’s earnings, Figure 3 shows a less pronounced difference in the discontinuity 
between the bottom LTO countries (Panel A) and the top LTO countries (Panel B). As such, these results 
provide indicative evidence consistent with H3 that firms in countries scoring high on LTO avoid losses to 
a larger degree.  
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
To formally test H3, we regress ASM on LTO and the results are reported in Table 5. We present OLS 
country-regression results, as well as results from the corresponding WLS regression, where the number of 
firm-years in each country weights the observations. The OLS regression results show a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between LTO and the size of the discontinuity around the zero earnings 
benchmark (ASM_A), while the relationship between LTO and the benchmark for marginally beating 
previous year’s earnings (ASM_B) is positive but insignificant. The WLS regression results provide similar 
evidence. However, both coefficients on LTO are positive and statistically significant with this approach. 
Based on these findings, we conclude that the global discontinuity around earnings benchmark illustrated 
in Figure 1 is driven by the top LTO countries, which is consistent with H3. Our interpretation of the results 
is that a larger reliance on AM enables more accurate benchmark beating. 





5. Robustness tests 
In this section, we provide robustness checks of our main findings by considering an alternative sample and 
alternative measures of LTO. In our full sample, the U.S. and Japan account for the largest number of 
observations, comprising 29.7 percent of the total sample. To ensure that firms in these countries do not 
drive our main findings, we exclude them from the sample and re-estimate the regressions. Table 6 presents 
the results where Panel A shows regressions for the zero earnings benchmark, while Panel B shows the 
regressions for prior year’s earnings benchmark. The conclusions from our main tests remain unchanged. 
In the case of RM, the coefficients for the interaction terms are negative for both earnings benchmarks (zero 
earnings: −0.00002 and prior year’s earnings: −0.00020). However, only the coefficient for prior year’s 
earnings is significant (t-stat: −3.15). With respect to AM, Panel A shows a positive and significant 
association (coef: 0.00009, t-stat: 2.32) for the zero earnings benchmark. Panel B shows a similar 
relationship between AM and the interaction term. Taken together, Table 6 shows that our results are not 
solely driven by the observations from the U.S. and Japan. 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
In our main analysis, we utilize the Hofstede et al. (2010) LTO score as a proxy for long-term orientation. 
Next, we examine if our results are robust to alternative measures of long-termism. As a first variation, we 
re-estimate our regressions with a continuous variable that ranks countries in ascending order from 
minimum (Egypt: 1) to maximum (South Korea: 47) long-term orientation (LTO_RANK). This approach 
reduces the impact of the irregular distances of the LTO scores between countries. Since culture may change 
over time, we utilize a second variation, by adopting a time-adjusted LTO dimension (LTO_TIME) 
developed by Tang and Koveos (2008). In a third variation, we use a survey-based patience measure (LTO-
_WAIT) as a proxy for long-term orientation. This measure, which is unrelated to the Hofstede 
methodology, is developed in Wang et al. (2016). In their study, participants from different countries were 
asked whether they would wait one month and receive $3800, or receive $3400 immediately, to generate a 
measure of long-term thinking and time discounting. Based on the wide range of variation in the answers 
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at the country-level, we define countries with a higher wait rate as more long-term oriented. For the 
countries in our sample, Germany is the most long-term oriented country where 89 percent of the 
participants chose to wait and Chile is the least long-term oriented country where 37 percent of the 
participants chose to wait. In a final variation in how we measure long-termism, we use the future-time 
reference of the main language in a country by following Chen et al. (2013) and Kim et al. (2017). Countries 
with languages that grammatically associate the future and the present are defined as short-term oriented or 
myopic while countries with languages that generally do not differentiate between present and future events 
are categorized as long-term oriented. For example, English (short-term oriented) requires speakers to use 
a grammatical marker for future events when predicting rain by saying “It will rain tomorrow” whereas a 
German (long-term oriented) speaker can express the same in present tense with the expression “Morgen 
regnet es”, which translates into “It rains tomorrow”. Compared to English speakers, German speakers are 
likely to perceive the future as imminent due to this disassociation of time. Therefore, we replace LTO with 
a dummy variable indicating the long-term orientation of the main language of the country (LTO_FTR). 
The correlation between the LTO measure and the four alternative measures are all positive and significant 
(0.988, 0.778, 0.498, and 0.634 for LTO_RANK, LTO_TIME, LTO_WAIT, and LTO_FTR, respectively). 
Table 7 reports the regression results for Equation (5) using the alternative measures. To improve 
readability, only the variable of interest is reported.  
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 7 presents results where RM is regressed on the different proxy variables for long-term 
orientation utilizing the zero earnings benchmark as incentive setting. In all specifications, the coefficients 
of interest are negative. However, only LTO_RANK is statistically significant. Panel B show results for 
RM and the different proxy variables for LTO, based on the context of beating prior year’s earnings. The 
interaction coefficients are negative and highly significant (t-stats ranging from −6.45 to –2.91). Panel C 
focuses on AM and the zero earnings benchmark. All interaction term coefficients are positive and 
significant in the case of LTO_RANK, LTO_TIME and LTO_FTR. Panel D shows the results from the 
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specifications where we regress AM on the interaction between the different proxies and BENCH_B. Here, 
the coefficients of interest are all positive and three out of four significant.  
The findings in Table 7 are consistent with H1 and H2. In other words, the robustness test confirms a 
negative relationship between RM and long-termism and a positive relationship between AM and long-
termism. For the 16 regressions in this robustness test, the coefficient of interest is in the direction that 
supports this statement in all 16 specifications and statistically significant in 11 of 16 specifications. In 
addition, we also test H3 with the alternative measures for long-termism. The results, which we do not 
tabulate, are consistent with the results reported in Table 5.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Myopic managerial behavior always draws attention and passionate arguments. We provide evidence of a 
robust association between myopia and the different EM strategies used to beat earnings benchmarks. We 
use a large sample of firms from 47 countries for the time period 2003 to 2015. As a proxy for myopic 
cultures, we utilize the long-term orientation score of Hofstede et al. (2010). First, we find a negative 
association between the engagement of RM and country-level long-termism. Second, we find the opposite 
association for AM. Finally, we observe that long-term oriented countries are more prone to precisely beat 
earnings benchmarks. 
Our results contribute to the literature on EM by providing country-level evidence consistent with the Zang 
(2012) tradeoff argument of firm-level costs associated with different EM strategies. In line with our 
findings, management in long-term oriented countries perceive RM as a costly alternative due to its negative 
effect on future cash flows. Consequently, and consistent with the tradeoff argument, management in long-
term oriented countries engage in more AM to beat earnings benchmarks. Furthermore, the utilization of 
AM enables firms to beat earnings benchmarks with higher precision than through RM and this provides 
an explanation for our third finding.  
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A majority of the prior literature on EM arises from the U.S. setting, where myopia is prevalent. Graham et 
al. (2005) find a preference for RM in the U.S. setting, our international sample results highlight country 
differences in the reliance of RM. Specifically, myopic countries (e.g., the U.S.) are more prone to use RM, 
whereas long-term oriented (e.g., South Korea) rely more on AM. Thus, we suggest that researchers should 
be aware of the differences in perceived costs and benefits of the different EM strategies, arising from the 
degree of long-termism.  
Finally, our study is subject to one major limitation. Both EM and myopia are abstract concepts which are 
difficult to measure directly. In our study, we capture these phenomena through the utilization of proxy 
variables, which by construction can include a bias. If the bias is unsystematic, it would only decrease the 
statistical significance. In addition, we analyze EM in a clear incentive setting which further mitigates 
concerns regarding the EM measurement errors. For robustness purposes, we also mitigate concerns 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Firm variables 
ACFO  Abnormal cash flow from operations 
ADISEXP Abnormal discretionary expenses 
AM  Accrual manipulation measured as discretionary accruals 
APROD Abnormal production costs 
BENCH_A Indicator variable for firm-years with small earnings (ROA in the closed interval 0 and 1 
percent) 
BENCH_B Indicator variable for firm-years with small increases in earnings (Increases in the closed 
interval 0 to 1 percent of total assets) 
LEV  Financial leverage, total debt divided by total assets 
RM  Composite measure of real earnings management (APROD+ACFO+ADISEXP) 
ROA  Return on assets 
SIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets 
Country variables 
LTO  Hofstede's long-term orientation score. All Hofstede's measures are obtained from his 
website: http://geert-hofstede.com/-dimensions.html 
LTO_RANK Country-ranked LTO variable ranging from 1 to 47 
LTO_TIME Long-term orientation score from Tang and Koveos (2008) 
LTO_WAIT  Patience measure based on Wang et al. (2016) 
LTO_FTR Future-time reference of the main language in a country following Chen et al. (2013) and 
Kim et al. (2017) 
ASM_A Asymmetry measure of Glaum et al. (2004) around the zero earnings benchmark 
ASM_B Asymmetry measure of Glaum et al. (2004) around the prior year’s earnings benchmark 
PDI  Hofstede's power distance score 
MAS  Hofstede's masculinity score 
CORR   Transparency international corruption index 
HDI A country's human development index; available from http://hdr.undp.org/en 
/content/human-development-index-hdi  
JUD  A country's judicial efficiency index obtained from Andrei Shleifer's website 
RIGHTS_SH Shareholder’s rights from La Porta et al. (1998) 
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RIGHTS_CR Creditor’s rights from La Porta et al. (1998) 
OWN  Ownership concentration from La Porta et al. (1998) 
























Panel A: Zero earnings benchmark Panel B: Prior year's earnings benchmark
ACFO t-stat APROD t-stat ADISEXP t-stat ACFO t-stat APROD t-stat ADISEXP t-stat
Main variable Main variable
BENCH_A * LTO -0.00008*** (-3.28) -0.00008** (-2.02) 0.00003 (0.76) BENCH_B * LTO -0.00008*** (-4.35) -0.00014*** (-5.76) -0.00003 (-1.47)
Control variables Control variables
BENCH_A 0.0092*** (4.68) 0.0164*** (4.94) 0.0022 (0.81) BENCH_B 0.0053*** (3.77) 0.0115*** (5.17) 0.0033** (2.01)
LTO 0.0001** (2.65) 0.0000 (1.41) -0.0000* (-1.71) LTO 0.0001*** (3.04) 0.0001** (2.28) -0.0000 (-0.81)
SIZE 0.0037*** (8.77) 0.0032*** (12.02) -0.0009*** (-3.71) SIZE 0.0037*** (8.72) 0.0031*** (12.48) -0.0010*** (-3.77)
ROA -0.1446*** (-16.79) -0.1532*** (-16.83) 0.0016 (0.32) ROA -0.1448*** (-16.74) -0.1538*** (-16.74) 0.0014 (0.26)
LEV -0.0016 (-1.03) 0.0007 (0.38) 0.0055** (2.28) LEV -0.0013 (-0.88) 0.0014 (0.71) 0.0058** (2.32)
INTERCEPT -0.0554*** (-9.02) -0.0342*** (-8.56) 0.0255*** (6.27) INTERCEPT -0.0554*** (-9.03) -0.0335*** (-8.79) 0.0258*** (6.19)
Industry FE Industry FE
Year FE Year FE
R-squared R-squared











This table presents estimates from a OLS regression of individual real earnings management measures (ACFO, APROD and ADISEXP) on our variable of interest, the interaction between BENCH
(BENCH_A and BENCH_B) and LTO, controlling for firm characteristics. Panel A presents the results with BENCH_A, which is a dummy variable with the value 1 if ROA is larger than zero and smaller
than 0.01, otherwise BENCH_A has the value 0. Panel B presents the results with BENCH__B, which is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the change in earnings divided by total assets is larger than zero
and smaller than 0.01, otherwise BENCH_B has the value 0. LTO is the long-term orientation score from Hofstede et al. (2010). The data sample covers 47 countries for the time period from 2003 to 2015.




Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Country  Firm-Year Obs. LTO RM |RM| AM |AM| TA ROA LEV
Australia 9,775 21 0.000 0.130 0.003 0.055 43196 -0.023 0.044
Austria 605 60 0.010 0.080 0.000 0.024 464003 0.034 0.253
Belgium 908 82 0.004 0.067 -0.003 0.025 316121 0.034 0.219
Brazil 1,857 44 0.012 0.095 -0.014 0.035 711288 0.037 0.270
Bulgaria 1,034 69 0.004 0.104 0.019 0.049 14393 0.006 0.082
Canada 11,384 36 0.000 0.100 -0.002 0.052 65758 -0.040 0.065
Chile 1,052 31 0.001 0.077 0.007 0.034 330201 0.038 0.221
China 19,093 87 0.002 0.071 -0.004 0.022 361830 0.031 0.226
Colombia 263 13 0.004 0.050 0.017 0.029 387398 0.028 0.119
Croatia 175 58 0.000 0.047 0.006 0.026 198912 0.013 0.272
Denmark 1,004 35 0.003 0.101 -0.003 0.033 156825 0.030 0.199
Egypt 659 7 0.002 0.086 -0.010 0.038 220817 0.066 0.104
Finland 1,098 38 0.011 0.115 -0.002 0.027 257156 0.040 0.249
France 5,798 63 0.000 0.064 0.004 0.026 173632 0.029 0.193
Germany 5,625 83 0.008 0.123 0.001 0.032 158947 0.032 0.169
Great Britain 11,246 51 0.003 0.104 0.000 0.040 111136 0.032 0.126
Greece 1,596 45 0.003 0.067 0.016 0.030 160370 0.004 0.332
Hong Kong 10,562 61 0.007 0.097 0.005 0.033 256692 0.040 0.153
Hungary 186 58 -0.010 0.080 -0.018 0.032 109298 0.023 0.184
India 14,408 51 0.004 0.081 0.007 0.026 78412 0.040 0.291
Indonesia 2,889 62 0.002 0.106 0.018 0.053 144975 0.036 0.216
Ireland 375 24 0.010 0.078 -0.007 0.033 275802 0.034 0.144
Israel 1,202 38 0.005 0.090 0.011 0.032 126509 0.019 0.249
Japan 34,444 88 0.002 0.062 0.013 0.025 269646 0.024 0.171
Malaysia 7,748 41 0.002 0.068 0.004 0.025 85135 0.033 0.177
Mexico 883 24 0.003 0.077 -0.006 0.027 1245634 0.040 0.217
Netherlands 1,054 67 0.002 0.102 -0.004 0.027 872264 0.042 0.230
New Zealand 741 33 0.000 0.107 -0.004 0.030 147202 0.041 0.211
Norway 1,372 35 0.004 0.109 0.002 0.041 371729 0.025 0.269
Pakistan 966 50 0.004 0.096 0.004 0.034 118694 0.066 0.244
Peru 608 25 0.005 0.118 -0.009 0.044 175240 0.063 0.199
Philippines 1,241 27 0.002 0.079 0.000 0.033 111269 0.037 0.123
Poland 2,638 38 0.008 0.097 0.006 0.030 73159 0.035 0.164
Portugal 368 28 0.000 0.059 0.023 0.034 641620 0.016 0.400
Singapore 5,573 72 0.005 0.098 0.001 0.030 117203 0.043 0.169
Slovenia 214 49 0.011 0.061 0.007 0.027 124049 0.009 0.294
South Africa 2,132 34 0.008 0.107 -0.010 0.040 221819 0.069 0.155
South Korea 13,754 100 0.007 0.086 -0.006 0.029 119386 0.027 0.216
Spain 1,088 48 0.002 0.067 0.006 0.026 788227 0.023 0.327
Sweden 3,220 53 0.001 0.107 0.001 0.036 100523 0.040 0.152
Switzerland 1,739 74 0.007 0.102 0.000 0.025 428540 0.045 0.180
Taiwan 8,730 93 0.006 0.070 -0.001 0.024 192550 0.039 0.192
Thailand 4,205 32 0.004 0.087 -0.002 0.030 76836 0.054 0.215
Turkey 2,019 46 0.005 0.092 0.007 0.032 175775 0.034 0.163
U.S.A. 36,278 26 0.004 0.102 -0.014 0.037 337373 0.030 0.169
Venezuela 117 16 0.030 0.130 0.021 0.061 208560 0.038 0.154
Vietnam 3,599 57 0.001 0.115 0.003 0.044 20910 0.043 0.229
This table presents LTO and country-level median values of variables for our firm-year observarions. The data sample covers
47 countries for the time period from 2003 to 2015 and contains 237,535 firm-year observations. The variable definitions are































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Long-termism and real earnings management
Panel A: Zero earnings benchmark Panel B: Prior year's earnings benchmark
RM t-stat RM t-stat RM t-stat RM t-stat
Main variable Main variable
BENCH_A * LTO -0.0003*** (-3.04) -0.0001** (-2.00) BENCH_B * LTO -0.0004*** (-6.42) -0.0003*** (-5.88)
Control variables Control variables
BENCH_A 0.0375*** (5.18) 0.0243*** (5.04) BENCH_B 0.0291*** (5.99) 0.0214*** (5.33)
LTO 0.0002*** (2.88) 0.0001 (1.54) LTO 0.0002*** (3.56) 0.0001** (2.35)
SIZE 0.0083*** (10.38) 0.0101*** (11.32) SIZE 0.0081*** (10.58) 0.0099*** (11.72)
ROA -0.3821*** (-14.51) -0.4071*** (-16.95) ROA -0.3834*** (-14.41) -0.4080*** (-16.91)
LEV 0.0049 (0.85) -0.0004 (-0.13) LEV 0.0062 (1.04) 0.0003 (0.08)
PDI 0.0002*** (4.92) PDI 0.0003*** (4.86)
MAS -0.0002*** (-4.68) MAS -0.0001*** (-4.40)
CORR 0.0002 (1.66) CORR 0.0002* (1.71)
HDI -0.1563*** (-7.88) HDI -0.1593*** (-8.00)
JUD 0.0004 (0.58) JUD 0.0005 (0.62)
RIGHTS_SH -0.0014 (-1.19) RIGHTS_SH -0.0015 (-1.29)
RIGHTS_CR 0.0049*** (5.39) RIGHTS_CR 0.0049*** (5.36)
OWN -0.0002 (-0.03) OWN -0.0004 (-0.09)
GDP -0.0029*** (-5.45) GDP -0.0030*** (-5.54)
INTERCEPT -0.1110*** (-7.84) 0.0000 (0.00) INTERCEPT -0.11081*** (-7.95) 0.0027 (0.16)
Industry FE No Industry FE
Year FE No Year FE
R-squared 0.050 R-squared





This table presents estimates from a OLS regression of real earnings management (RM) on our variable of interest, the interaction between
BENCH (BENCH_A and BENCH_B) and LTO, controlling for firm characteristics and country characteristics. Panel A presents the results
with BENCH_A, which is a dummy variable with the value 1 if ROA is larger than zero and smaller than 0.01, otherwise BENCH_A has the
value 0. Panel B presents the results with BENCH__B, which is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the change in earnings divided by total
assets is larger than zero and smaller than 0.01, otherwise BENCH_B has the value 0. LTO is the long-term orientation score from Hofstede
et al. (2010). The data sample covers 47 countries for the time period from 2003 to 2015. The variable definitions are presented in Appendix









Table 4: Long-termism and accrual manipulation
Panel A: Zero earnings benchmark Panel B: Prior year's earnings benchmark
AM t-stat AM t-stat AM t-stat AM t-stat
Main variable Main variable
BENCH_A * LTO 0.00003 (0.78) 0.00010*** (3.87) BENCH_B * LTO 0.00007*** (3.37) 0.00008*** (3.85)
Control variables Control variables
BENCH_A 0.0072** (2.56) 0.0024 (0.92) BENCH_B -0.0017 (-0.93) -0.0012 (-0.62)
LTO 0.0001*** (6.23) 0.0001*** (2.89) LTO 0.0001*** (5.95) 0.0001*** (2.90)
SIZE -0.0033*** (-4.67) -0.0034*** (-3.54) SIZE -0.0034*** (-4.54) -0.0035*** (-3.49)
ROA -0.0458*** (-5.29) -0.0479*** (-4.64) ROA -0.0460*** (-5.36) -0.0482*** (-4.69)
LEV 0.0096*** (3.19) 0.0094** (2.39) LEV 0.0103*** (3.23) 0.0099** (2.41)
PDI 0.0000 (1.16) PDI 0.0000 (1.17)
MAS 0.0002*** (4.82) MAS 0.0002*** (4.88)
CORR 0.0005*** (5.41) CORR 0.0005*** (5.37)
HDI -0.1072*** (-6.51) HDI -0.1070*** (-6.55)
JUD -0.0005 (-0.92) JUD -0.0005 (-0.91)
RIGHTS_SH -0.0013 (-1.33) RIGHTS_SH -0.0013 (-1.33)
RIGHTS_CR 0.0009 (1.14) RIGHTS_CR 0.0009 (1.15)
OWN 0.0196** (2.38) OWN 0.0196** (2.40)
GDP -0.0011*** (-5.31) GDP -0.0011*** (-5.34)
INTERCEPT 0.03147*** (4.19) 0.0903*** (4.42) INTERCEPT 0.0323*** (4.16) 0.0918*** (4.46)
Industry FE Industry FE
Year FE Year FE
R-squared R-squared









This table presents estimates from a OLS regression of accrual manipulation (AM) on our variable of interest, the interaction between
BENCH (BENCH_A and BENCH_B) and LTO, controlling for firm characteristics and country characteristics. Panel A presents the results
with BENCH_A, which is a dummy variable with the value 1 if ROA is larger than zero and smaller than 0.01, otherwise BENCH_A has
the value 0. Panel B presents the results with BENCH__B, which is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the change in earnings divided by
total assets is larger than zero and smaller than 0.01, otherwise BENCH_B has the value 0. LTO is the long-term orientation score from
Hofstede et al. (2010). The data sample covers 47 countries for the time period from 2003 to 2015. The variable definitions are presented in

















Table 5: Long-termism and benchmark beating
OLS WLS
ASM_A t-stat ASM_B t-stat ASM_A t-stat ASM_B t-stat
LTO 0.0039*** (3.96) 0.0001 (0.22) 0.0066*** (4.19) 0.0016*** (2.73)
INTERCEPT 0.2245*** (4.53) 0.0283 (0.78) 0.0517 (0.59) -0.0425 (-1.34)
R-squared
No of obs.
0.259 0.001 0.546 0.288
47 47 47 47
This table presents estimates from a OLS and WLS regression of benchmark beating measures (ASM_A and ASM_B) on our variable of
interest, LTO, which is the long-term orientation score from Hofstede et al. (2010). The weights in the WLS regression is the number of
firm-year observations per country. The data sample covers 47 countries for the time period from 2003 to 2015. The variable definitions













Table 6: Long-termism and earnings management in regressions excluding U.S. and Japan
Panel A: Zero earnings benchmark Panel B: Prior year's earnings benchmark
RM t-stat AM t-stat RM t-stat AM t-stat
Main variable Main variable
BENCH_A * LTO -0.00002 (-0.17) 0.00009** (2.32) BENCH_B * LTO -0.00020*** (-3.15) 0.00014*** (4.48)
Control variables Control variables
BENCH_A 0.0188*** (2.82) 0.0027 (0.83) BENCH_B 0.0147*** (3.16) -0.0059** (-2.44)
LTO 0.0001** (2.13) -0.0001 (-0.92) LTO 0.0001*** (2.78) -0.0001 (-1.01)
SIZE 0.0103*** (11.02) -0.0034*** (-2.84) SIZE 0.0102*** (11.20) -0.0035*** (-2.80)
ROA -0.4049*** (-15.87) -0.0464*** (-4.48) ROA -0.4056*** (-15.82) -0.0466*** (-4.51)
LEV 0.0027 (0.51) 0.0153*** (4.41) LEV 0.0040 (0.77) 0.0159*** (4.47)
PDI 0.0003*** (5.67) -0.0000 (-1.24) PDI 0.0003*** (5.52) -0.0000 (-1.21)
MAS -0.0001** (-2.51) 0.0000 (0.21) MAS -0.0001** (-2.48) 0.0000 (0.18)
CORR 0.0004*** (2.97) 0.0002** (2.06) CORR 0.0004*** (2.87) 0.0002* (1.99)
HDI -0.1954*** (-6.49) -0.0428*** (-3.68) HDI -0.1954*** (-6.46) -0.0425*** (-3.64)
JUD -0.0004 (-0.56) 0.0002 (0.27) JUD -0.0004 (-0.48) 0.0002 (0.28)
RIGHTS_SH -0.0019* (-1.78) -0.0005 (-0.45) RIGHTS_SH -0.0020* (-1.86) -0.0005 (-0.44)
RIGHTS_CR 0.0059*** (7.89) -0.0000 (-0.01) RIGHTS_CR 0.0059*** (7.83) -0.0000 (-0.01)
OWN 0.0011 (0.15) 0.0251*** (2.91) OWN 0.0014 (0.19) 0.0254*** (2.96)
GDP -0.0034*** (-5.02) -0.0002 (-0.58) GDP -0.0034*** (-5.01) -0.0002 (-0.58)
INTERCEPT 0.0060 (0.27) 0.0604*** (2.94) INTERCEPT 0.0070 (0.32) 0.0615*** (2.96)
Industry FE Industry FE
Year FE Year FE
R-squared R-squared












This table presents estimates from OLS regressions of earnings management (RM and AM) on our variable of interest the interaction between
BENCH (BENCH_A and BENCH_B) and LTO, controlling for firm characteristics and country characteristics. Panel A presents the results with
BENCH_A, which is a dummy variable with the value 1 if ROA is larger than zero and smaller than 0.01, otherwise BENCH_A has the value 0.
Panel B presents the results with BENCH__B, which is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the change in earnings divided by total assets is larger
than zero and smaller than 0.01, otherwise BENCH_B has the value 0. LTO is the long-term orientation score from Hofstede et al. (2010). The data
sample covers 47 countries for the time period from 2003 to 2015. Firm-year observations from the U.S. and Japan are excluded in this regression.
The variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. *10% significance; **5% significance; ***1% signifcance.
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